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ABSTRACT 
 
 
India has experienced a much-documented dowry inflation since the 1950s, which has 
been attributed to a spurt in population growth post-World War II. Will recent declines in 
fertility lead to a reversal of this trend and a regime of bride price? My paper develops a 
dynamic general equilibrium model of marriage markets, sex-ratio choice and population 
growth that is used to characterize the long-run relationship between population 
dynamics and marriage payments in India. I show that in the absence of exogenous sex 
preferences for offspring, and with no asymmetries between men and women except in 
desired ages of marriage (of self and spouse), any long run equilibrium will be 
characterized by an excess supply of brides, dowry payments and a masculine sex ratio. 
The result holds for parameters consistent with marriage market indicators in India. 
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Many traditional societies follow the practice of making transfers at the time of
marriage. When the transfer is made from the bride to the groom, it is called
a dowry, whereas the reverse transaction ￿from groom to bride ￿is called bride
price. Both practices of dowry and bride price have been known to coexist in India
(Epstein (1973), Billig (1991, 1992), Rao (1993), Dalmia and Lawrence (2005)).
Typically areas in north India have followed the practice of dowry whereas regions
of the south observed bride price. In the latter half of the last century, however,
a real in￿ ation of dowries has been observed throughout the country (Epstein
(1973), Billig (1991, 1992), Rao (1993)). This has involved an increase in the
real value of dowries in the regions where it was practiced as well as a switch to
dowries in areas that used to pay bride price.
A popular explanation for the Indian dowry in￿ ation is the marriage squeeze
hypothesis (Caldwell et al (1982, 1983), Billig (1991, 1992), Rao (1993), Bhat and
Halli (1999)), which attributes the rise in dowries to population growth. The ar-
gument runs as follows. Higher rates of population growth lead to larger numbers
of younger relative to older cohorts in the population. When older men marry
younger women, as is the case in India, this causes an excess supply of brides in
the marriage market ￿or a marriage squeeze against women ￿causing a bidding
up of the price of grooms. Hence dowry in￿ ation occurs. The Indian population
started to grow in the 1930s (see Table and Figure 1) and the dowry in￿ ation
was documented since the 1950s when babies of the population ￿ boom￿would
have reached marriageable age. Hence the marriage squeeze hypothesis appears
to be a plausible explanation for the dowry in￿ ation in India (Maitra (2006), Rao
(1993))1.
Recent trends in Indian demographics, however, suggest a de-intensi￿cation
of the marriage squeeze against women. Fertility levels and crude birth rates
have both been declining since the 1980s (see Table and Figure 2). Moreover,
the sex ratio ￿which has always been skewed in favor of men (Sen (1992)) ￿has
become even more masculine over the 1980s (see Table and Figure 3), the decade in
1The overall sex ratio in India has been skewed in favor of men throughout the past century.
However, the correct indicator of a marriage squeeze is not the overall sex ratio but the ratio
of men and women of marriageable age. Caldwell et al (1983) attempt to measure this ratio
and conclude that a de￿cit of 4 million women in the marriage market in 1931 was replaced by
a surplus of the same magnitude by 1971. Clearly, population growth in the last century has
outweighed the initial bias in the sex ratio ensuring that the ￿ missing women￿were not su¢ cient
in number to ease the squeeze against women.
1which ultrasound technology and sex-selective abortion techniques became widely
available in India (Hutter et al (1996), Sudha and Rajan (1999)).
The recent decline in fertility levels and the widespread practice of sex-selective
abortion against women lead naturally to the question ￿will the marriage squeeze
against women reverse in the long run (Bhat and Halli (1999), Das Gupta and
Shuzhuo (1999))? Will bride price then emerge as the dominant form of marriage
payments in India?
The answers to these questions are of interest for at least three reasons. First,
it is a well-documented fact that brides in India have been victims of domestic
violence and even murder if unable to pay the exorbitant dowries demanded by
their husbands (Bloch and Rao (2002)). Second, fear of high dowries leads parents
to kill their daughters through either infanticide or sex-selective abortion methods
(Sudha and Rajan (1999), Arnold, Kishor and Roy(2002)). Lastly, there is a
substantial literature that suggests that an improvement in female bargaining
power may lead to better outcomes in intra-household allocations (Thomas (1990),
Hoddinot and Haddad (1995), Du￿ o (2003), Pitt et al (2003), Case and Ardington
(2005)). Hence the question of the future of female bargaining power in the Indian
marriage market is one that is worthy of investigation. Here I attempt to provide
an answer.
I show that when parents actively choose the sex ratio of o⁄spring based on
expectations of their marriage market outcomes in future, any long-run steady
state equilibrium will be characterized by a marriage squeeze against women, the
existence of dowry payments and a sex ratio that is skewed in favor of men. The
result ￿which holds for parameter values consistent with Indian marriage market
indicators ￿provides a remarkably accurate description of current marriage market
conditions in India. In particular, it explains why dowry payments can persist even
in the face of long-practised infanticide and feticide against women.
The result described above follows from a dynamic general equilibrium model
(in an overlapping generations framework) that explicitly captures the two-way
link between population dynamics and marriage market outcomes. Population dy-
namics can impact marriage payments by in￿ uencing the structure of the marriage
market, viz. whether there is an excess supply of brides/grooms of the ideal mar-
riageable ages2. This is the ￿rst link from population dynamics to the marriage
market. However, expectations of future marriage market outcomes also play a
2The only asymmetry between men and women in the model lies in their ￿ ideal￿ age of
marriage. Speci￿cally, women prefer to marry young and prefer older men. Men prefer to marry
when older and prefer younger women.
2role in determining the optimal sex ratio of o⁄spring that parents choose. For ex-
ample, if dowries are expected to persist in the future, parents are likely to choose
more sons than daughters, thereby skewing the sex ratio against women. This
comprises the second link from marriage payments to population dynamics, since
the sex ratio thus chosen determines the population structure (and hence marriage
payments) in future periods. Figure A provides a diagrammatic representation of
the two-way link and the composite model used in this paper.
A long-run (steady state) general equilibrium occurs when population dynam-
ics ￿the growth rate and the sex ratio ￿and marriage payments are the same
over time.
I ￿nd that when the sex ratio is exogenous, the intuition of the marriage
squeeze hypothesis is valid even in the long run. That is, there exist long-run
equilibria with bride price when the fertility level is low, just as there exist dowry
equilibria when the fertility level is high. To see how, consider an overlapping
generations framework where agents can be young (age ￿ 0￿ ) or old (age ￿ 1￿ ). When
men marry later than women, the marriage market comprises men of age ￿ 1￿and
women of ages ￿ 0￿and ￿ 1￿ . The number of men in the market is then governed by
the male-to-female sex ratio ￿. The number of young women (age ￿ 0￿ ) is governed
by the growth rate of the population (1 + b r) and the number of old women (age
￿ 1￿ ) is driven by the proportion of young women who do not ￿nd a partner when
young, (1￿p0).3 There will be bride price in a long-run equilibrium if the number
3p0 is the proportion of young women who do ￿nd a partner when young (i.e. at age ￿ 0￿ ).
3of men exceeds the number of women in the market (an excess supply of men),
i.e. if ￿ > (1 + b r) + (1 ￿ p0). This could occur when the fertility level and hence
the growth rate (1+b r) is low. Similarly, dowry payments will occur in a long-run
equilibrium when ￿ < (1 + b r) + (1 ￿ p0) (an excess supply of women) which may
hold when the fertility level and hence (1 + b r) is high.
However, I show that when the sex ratio ￿ is endogenously determined based
on expectations of future marriage market outcomes then ￿ < (1 + b r) + (1 ￿ p0),
whatever be the level of fertility. In other words, any long-run equilibrium will
be characterized by dowry payments, even at a low level of fertility. Since dowry
is expected in future, parents wish to beget more sons than daughters and hence
the equilibrium sex ratio ￿ is skewed in favor of men.
Why can bride price not be sustained in a long-run equilibrium when the sex
ratio is endogenously determined by marriage market expectations? I show that
whenever bride price is expected, parents overproduce girls relative to boys. This
tips the balance against women in future periods, ensuring that bride price cannot
persist in equilibrium.
Why then do parents not overproduce boys in the dowry equilibrium even
when they choose to have more sons than daughters? The answer to this question
lies in the relative lifetime returns from marriage of men and women.
Recall that since men marry late they receive only a single period return from
marriage that is discounted because it occurs late. This imposes an upper limit
on the expected marriage market returns of men ￿and hence the ￿ value￿of a son ￿
even when he is expected to earn a dowry at the time of marriage. But the upper
limit on the value of a son imposes, in turn, an upper limit on the male-to-female
sex ratio, ￿, chosen by parents. This ensures that parents do not overproduce sons
even when they choose more sons than daughters. Hence, dowry can be sustained
in a long-run equilibrium even though bride price cannot.
With the advent of modern ultrasound and sex-selective abortion technology
in India, sex ratio choice is expected to have become easier for parents (Das Gupta
and Shuzhuo (1999)). Will the ease of sex-ratio selection ￿or a low cost of sex
ratio choice ￿make parents overproduce boys when dowries are expected, thereby
altering the result obtained above?
I show that low costs of sex ratio choice are a su¢ cient condition for the
main result to hold. The reason is that the low cost does not alter the fact that
men marry relatively late and get limited lifetime returns from marriage. This
Hence, (1￿ p0) is the proportion of women who return to the marriage market at age ￿ 1￿to look
for a spouse.
4guarantees that there is an upper limit on the sex ratio ￿ and ensures that sons
are not overproduced in the dowry equilibrium. However, bride price is even
less sustainable at low costs of sex ratio choice since parents are more likely to
overproduce daughters if bride price is expected!
The primary focus of the literature on the Indian dowry in￿ ation has been
to investigate if population growth may indeed have been responsible for the rise
in dowries in the last century (Rao (1993, 2000), Edlund (2000), Dalmia and
Lawrence (2005), Anderson (2005), Maitra (2006)). The emphasis has therefore
been on the short run impact of a demographic marriage squeeze. This paper
di⁄ers from the rest of the literature in that it focuses on the long run implications
of population dynamics on marriage payments, speci￿cally when marriage market
outcomes also have an impact on demographics through sex-ratio selection. As
the analysis demonstrates, using a general equilibrium framework is the key to
the main prediction, which explains why dowries can persist even in the face of
long-practised infanticide and feticide against women, as is widely observed in
India.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I outline the
dynamic general equilibrium model described in Figure A. Section 3 discusses a
suitable calibration of parameters that matches Indian marriage market indicators,
and presents the main result pertaining to Indian marriage markets. In Section 4,
I extend the analysis to allow a low cost of sex ratio choice. Section 5 summarizes
and concludes the paper.
2. The Model
The dynamic general equilibrium model described in Figure A has three compo-
nents ￿a model of marriage market bargaining and determination of marriage
payments, a model of population growth, and a model of sex-ratio choice ￿which
I shall present in order in the subsections that follow. I use an overlapping gener-
ations framework to analyze the marriage market and sex-ratio choices of agents,
and Pollak￿ s (1987) Two-Sex Birth-Matrix Mating-Rule Model with Persistent
Unions to link the marriage market to population growth4.
There are two groups of agents in the economy, males and females. Each agent
lives for two periods. Agents of the same age and sex are identical. All single,
4Tertilt (2005) uses a general equilibrium model in an overlapping generations framework to
analyze the e⁄ect of bride price on savings decisions. The sex ratio is exogenous in her analysis,
unlike in the present paper.
5never-married agents are in the marriage market in each period. Remarriage is not
permitted. Parents are responsible for arranging their o⁄spring￿ s marriage5. In
each period, therefore, parents of single (never-married) agents observe the number
of potential spouses of each type (age) in the market and submit their o⁄ers of
marriage payments and post-payments preferences for partners to a matchmaker.
The matchmaker then matches agents based on these post-marriage-payments
preferences and a matching rule that will be described below. After marriage,
couples ￿ choose￿the number of male and female o⁄spring based on the expected
surpluses that their o⁄spring will earn in the marriage market in future.
In the following subsections, I describe the model of marriage market bargain-
ing and determination of payments.
2.1. Marriage Market
2.1.1. Preferences
Preferences are common knowledge to all agents. Since parents arrange the mar-
riages of their o⁄spring, these may be interpreted as the utility from marriage
ascribed to agents by their parents.
Let Ui denote the period utility of agents of age i when single, where i =
0 (young);1 (old): Then,
U0(c) = c (M1)
U1(c) = c ￿ s
where c is consumption in the current period and s is the cost of being single in
old age. s can be attributed to social pressures to be married and loneliness in
old age.
Let U
g
i denote the period utility from marriage of an agent of sex g and age i.
The speci￿c form of the marital utility function is6:
U
f
i (c;i;a) = c + K ￿ (i ￿ 0)
2 ￿ (a ￿ 1)
2 (M2)
U
m
i (c;i;a) = c + K ￿ (i ￿ 1)
2 ￿ (a ￿ 0)
2
5The norm of arranged marriages is widely prevalent and accepted in India (Dasgupta and
Mukherjee (2003), Raman (1981)).
6Anderson (2005) uses similar marital utility functions to model the short-run mechanism of
a marriage squeeze. Bergstrom and Lam (1991) also use a similar utility function to demonstrate
how a marriage squeeze may be absorbed by changing age di⁄erentials of spouses. Their utility
formulation includes an ideal (own) age of marriage for men and women with the former being
higher than the latter.
6where i = 0 (young);1 (old), a denotes the age of the spouse at the time of
marriage, c denotes consumption in the current period and K (> 0) denotes
the utility from marriage, viz. companionship and the social network e⁄ects
of an extended family. If married young, agents receive a lifetime utility of
[U
g
0(c0;i;a) + ￿U
g
0(c1;i;a)] (where ￿ is the discount factor and ct denotes the
consumption chosen in period t) regardless of whether the spouse is living or dead
in the second period of marriage. In other words, having been married entitles
agents to the social network e⁄ects of an extended family even when the spouse
is not living.7
Each agent earns a wealth w in each period. In order to detract from issues of
saving and borrowing, I assume that w is perishable and high. The budget con-
straint is derived in Section 2.1.2, after an exposition of the structure of marriage
payments.
The marital utility functions U
g
i demonstrate agents￿preferences for own and
spouse￿ s age at marriage. Other things equal, men prefer to marry at age 1 and
women at age 0. Also, men prefer to marry younger women whereas women
prefer to marry older men. Possible reasons for women preferring to marry young
and men preferring young women could be the higher fertility of the latter, and,
in a largely patrilocal society such as India, their greater potential to adapt to
the ways of the groom￿ s family (Epstein (1973)). Men could prefer to marry
later because they seek to maintain a desired age di⁄erence between themselves
and their spouse as this helps to maintain a favorable balance of power in the
relationship (Jensen and Thornton (2003)). Women could prefer to marry older
men because of the latter￿ s higher social and economic standing, also a possible
reason why men themselves may prefer to postpone marriage in a social setting
where they are the primary wage earners. In this model, however, I make the
simplifying assumption that all agents earn the same wealth in every period,
hence I justify women￿ s preference for older men to be a result of the latter￿ s
higher standing in society (compared with younger men).
2.1.2. Marriage Payments
Marriage payments D are made in the period of marriage and may not be jointly
consumed by both spouses . By convention, let D > 0 denote a dowry paid by
the bride to the groom and D < 0 denote a bride price paid by the groom to the
7Relaxing this assumption and allowing agents a utility of c when the spouse is not alive does
not change the qualitative results of the paper.
7bride. Then the budget constraints in the period of marriage are:
c = w ￿ D; for the bride (M3:1)
c = w + D; for the groom
In all other periods, the budget constraints are:
c = w; for all agents (M3:2)
Let v
j
i denote the pre-payments marriage surplus of a woman of age i married
to a man of age j and V
j
i denote the pre-payments marriage surplus of a man
of age j married to a woman of age i. For old agents, this is the utility from
marrying an agent of a particular type (age) less the utility of remaining single at
the end of the period. Using (M1); (M2) and (M3), I derive,
v
j
1 = U
f
1 (w;1;j) ￿ U1 = K + s ￿ 1 ￿ (j ￿ 1)
2 (M4:1)
V
1
i = U
m
1 (w;1;i) ￿ U1 = K + s ￿ (i ￿ 0)
2
For young agents, the pre-payments surplus is the lifetime utility from marry-
ing an agent of a particular type less the expected return from postponing marriage
to the next period. The latter includes the utility from remaining single now as
well as the expectation of marriage returns in the next period (discounted by ￿).
I shall denote agents￿expectations of future marriage returns by Xg, where g de-
notes the gender of the agent. The speci￿c form of Xg depends on demographic
structure.8 Hence,
v
j
0 = U
f
0 (w;0;j)(1 + ￿) ￿ [U0 + ￿X
f] = (w + K ￿ (j ￿ 1)
2)(1 + ￿) ￿ [w + ￿X
f]
V
0
i = U
m
0 (w;0;i)(1+￿)￿[U0+￿X
m] = (w+K￿1￿(i￿0)
2)(1+￿)￿[w+￿X
m]
(M4:2)
De￿nition 1. A payment made in a marriage of a woman of age i and a man
of age j (i;j = 0;1) is feasible when D
j
i ￿ v
j
i and ￿V
j
i ￿ D
j
i: Henceforth, I shall
refer to these inequalities as feasibility constraints. Feasibility requires that each
agent earns at least as much as her/his reservation utility upon marriage.
De￿nition 2. An agent is eligible to marry if she is single and has never been
married before.
De￿nition 3. A marriage market participant is an eligible agent whose feasibility
constraints are satis￿ed at the o⁄ered payments.
8See equations (D:1) and (D:2) in Appendix D for a derivation of Xg in equilibrium, for a
speci￿c demographic case.
82.1.3. Search for Partners and the Matching Rule
Let us focus on a social planner￿ s matching outcome, viz. a matching rule that
maximizes the total marital surplus of married agents in each period. In the
framework described below, I shall use a speci￿c matching rule that achieves the
social planner￿ s matching outcome in equilibrium. The results obtained will be
true for all matching rules that generate the same equilibrium outcome, viz. that
maximize the total marital surplus of married agents.
In each period, parents of eligible agents observe the number of potential part-
ners in the market and submit their schedule of marriage payments along with
their post-payments preferences for partners to the matchmaker. The latter then
matches agents according to a rule that is speci￿ed below and is common knowl-
edge to all agents.
In agents￿(post-marriage-payments) ranking of preferences for potential part-
ners, let ￿ 1￿denote the ￿rst preference, ￿ 2￿denote the second preference and so
on. In case of indi⁄erence between potential partners who would have taken ranks
￿;(￿ + 1);:::;(￿ + n) in the preference ordering, let each of these agents receive
a rank of [
￿+(￿+1)+:::+(￿+n)
n+1 ]: Let F(x;y) denote the rank of male y in female x￿ s
preferences and M(x;y) denote the rank of female x in male y￿ s preferences. Also,
let (x;y) denote a match between a woman x and a man y:9 Then, the matching
rule is as follows:
i. Matchings (x;y) occur in increasing order of r(x;y) = F(x;y) + M(x;y);
i.e. the (x;y) with the minimum r(x;y) is matched ￿rst and then the rest
in increasing order of magnitude.
ii. In case of equal r(x;y), matches with the highest total (pre-payments) sur-
plus from marriage occur ￿rst. 10
iii. In case of identical total surplus from marriage, matching is random.
9Note that in this model, the actions of agents x and y are completely identi￿ed by their
ages. I refrain from labeling x and y as ages, however, to demonstrate the applicability of the
matching rule even when agents behave sub-optimally (e.g. if some agents choose to behave
di⁄erently from others of the same sex and age).
10The total marriage surplus in a marriage of a woman x and a man y is the sum of the
(pre-payments) marriage surplus that accrues to x from marrying y and that which goes to y
from marrying x. Since marriage surpluses depend only on sex and age in this model, if x is of
age i and y is of age j, then the total marriage surplus when they marry is S
j
i = (v
j
i + V
j
i ):
9The above rule speci￿es the order in which the matchmaker pairs agents.
Agents who express ￿ strict￿preferences for partners (as represented by r(x;y))
are paired ￿rst. When agents are indi⁄erent to the type of spouse, groups with
higher (pre-payments) marital surpluses are matched ￿rst. Among individuals
with the same marital surplus, matching occurs at random.
Note that the above matching rule is exhaustive, i.e. it does not leave marriage
market participants of both sexes unmatched.
I now de￿ne an equilibrium of marriage payments as follows.
De￿nition 4. An equilibrium (Nash) of marriage payments is a vector of feasible
marriage payments fD
j
ig from which no agent has an incentive to deviate. Each
agent of the same age and sex is identical and hence o⁄ers to pay/receive the same
marriage payments in equilibrium.
De￿nition 5. An equilibrium matching rule is a rule that speci￿es the order in
which agents are matched when the latter o⁄er (Nash) equilibrium marriage pay-
ments. This rule typically involves random matches among identical individuals.
The following propositions are then true:11
Proposition 1. Let m and f denote the number of eligible men and women in
the marriage market in any period. Suppose the following demographic conditions
are true:
(a) m 6= f; i.e. there are some agents in the market who are not guaranteed a
match that meets the reservation utility
(b) The numbers of men and women with the highest (pre-payments) marriage
surpluses are not equal to each other or to the total number of prospective
partners in the market.
Then agents whose types are matched in equilibrium with both types of the
opposite sex must o⁄er (receive) payments that make them indi⁄erent to the type
of their spouses. Further, if the matching rule leaves some young agents matched
and some unmatched, then the former￿ s marriage payments must be such that
make them indi⁄erent between marrying now and marrying later.
11A discussion of Propositions 1 and 2 is provided in Appendix A.
10Proposition 2. When conditions (a) and (b) above are true, the equilibrium
in marriage payments is unique and so is the equilibrium matching rule. When
condition (a) or (b) is violated, there may be multiple equilibria in marriage
payments but the equilibrium matching rule is unique. In both cases, the unique
matching rule matches high (pre-payments) surplus agents before low surplus
agents thereby obtaining the social planner￿ s matching outcome in which the total
marital surplus of all agents is maximized.
Note that the equilibrium matching rule satis￿es the following axioms:
1. Non-negativity: The number of matches is non-negative.
2. Adding-Up: The total number of agents in any age-sex category is greater
than or equal to the number of matched agents in that demographic category,
in each period.
3. Universal Scope: The matching rule is de￿ned for all non-zero populations.
4. Continuity: The equilibrium matching rule pairs high-surplus agents ￿rst
and is continuous when the categories of high-surplus agents do not change
over time.
5. Homogeneity: The equilibrium matching rule is homogeneous of degree one,
when the categories of high-surplus agents do not change over time.
Pollak (1987) assumes the above properties of the matching rule in establish-
ing the existence of stable population equilibria in the Birth-Matrix-Mating-Rule
Model described in Section 2.2.
2.1.4. Example 1: Determination of Marriage Payments
Consider a simple static model in which the discount factor ￿ = 0. Also suppose,
for concreteness, that parameters s and K are in the range: 0 < s < 1; K > 2:
In this static model, the pre-payments marriage surpluses of women can be
derived from (M4:1) and (M4:2) as:
v
0
0 = K ￿ 1 (E1:1)
v
1
0 = K
v
0
1 = K + s ￿ 2
v
1
1 = K + s ￿ 1
11From (M4:1) and (M4:2); the pre-payments marriage surpluses of men are:
V
0
0 = K ￿ 1 (E1:2)
V
1
0 = K + s
V
0
1 = K ￿ 2
V
1
1 = K + s ￿ 1
Since 0 < s < 1; K > 2, we can show
v
1
0 > v
1
1 > v
0
0 > v
0
1 > 0; (E1:3:1)
V
1
0 > V
1
1 > V
0
0 > V
0
1 > 0;
S
1
0 > S
1
1 > S
0
0 > S
0
1
where S
j
i = v
j
i + V
j
i is the total marriage surplus of a match (i;j).
The ordering of S
j
i in (E1:3:1) ensures that the matchmaker pairs old men
before young men and young women before old women, when agents are indi⁄erent
to the age of their spouse.
Let fi (mj) denote the number of eligible women of age i (men of age j) in the
marriage market (i;j = 0;1). Let (i;j) denote a match between a woman of age
i and a man of age j.
Consider the case where f0 < m1 < m1 + m0 < f0 + f1: This is an example
where the total number of eligible women in the marriage market exceeds the total
number of eligible men, so women have to bid for men in equilibrium. What are
the marriage payments in equilibrium?
The matching rule indicated by (E1:3:1) implies that the equilibrium marriage
payments will be:
D
0
0 = K + s ￿ 3 (no (0;0) matches in equilibrium)
D
1
0 = K + s ￿ 2 > 0
D
0
1 = K + s ￿ 2 > 0
D
1
1 = K + s ￿ 1 > 0
Discussion: In this example, the total number of eligible women exceeds the
total number of eligible men, hence women will have to bid for their partners
in equilibrium. Also, since young women are the ￿ high-surplus￿female agents
(see (E1:3:1)), they can outbid older women for a match. But recall, from the
speci￿cation of the matching rule, that high-surplus women are paired ￿rst when
12men are indi⁄erent to the age of women. Therefore, young women need only o⁄er
the amounts of dowry that make potential spouses indi⁄erent to the age of their
brides, i.e. D
j
0 = D
j
1￿1: How much do older women o⁄er? Since older women are
low-surplus agents, they are matched after young women when the latter bid to
make men indi⁄erent to the age of their brides. This does not leave enough men
in the market for all older women (since m1 +m0 ￿f0 < f1). Hence older women
bid away their entire marriage surplus, v
j
1; as dowry.
Notice that there are two types of competition among agents in excess supply,
here women. In this example, within-group competition among older women makes
them give away their entire marital surplus as dowry. This happens because the
parameter values, matching rule and marriage market demographics ensure that
there are not enough men for all the older women in the market. The high-surplus
young women do not engage in within-group competition since the matching rule
ensures that they are matched ￿rst (when they o⁄er enough to make men indif-
ferent to the age of women) and that there are enough men for all women of age
0 (f0 < m1 + m0). However, between-group competition implies that they have to
match the o⁄ers made by older women, which is why younger women also pay a
positive dowry in equilibrium.
It is easy to see that at the equilibrium payments the matching rule will indeed
pair high surplus agents ￿rst. This is because at these payments all agents are in-
di⁄erent to the age of their spouses. Thus the post-marriage-payments preference
rankings submitted to the matchmaker look like:
F(i;j) 0 1
0 1:5 1:5
1 1:5 1:5
M(i;j) 0 1
0 1:5 1:5
1 1:5 1:5
So, r(0;0) = r(0;1) = r(1;0) = r(1;1) = 3
In equilibrium, therefore, the high-surplus agents (older men and younger
women) are matched before others and matching among identical agents (of the
same age and sex) is random. This ensures that all men and all young women are
matched but some older women are left unmatched at the end of the period.
2.2. Population Dynamics
I use Pollak￿ s (1987) Birth-Matrix Mating-Rule (BMMR) Model with Persistent
Unions, to model the evolution of the population and connect it to marriage mar-
ket decisions modeled in the previous section. As Pollak (1986, 1987, 1990) demon-
strates, the existence, uniqueness and dynamic stability of population equilibria
are often hard to establish analytically. I show in this paper that under certain
13(realistic) parametric calibrations, it is possible to narrow down the characteristics
of dynamic steady state equilibria quite e⁄ectively.
The main constructs of Pollak￿ s (1987) model are a matrix of female births to
couples of each type (i;j), a (male/female) sex ratio at birth ￿ and a mating rule
that speci￿es the number of matches ￿ij of each type (i;j) in each period. Using
these, he shows that the evolution of the population vector and the ￿ old unions￿
vector (de￿ned below) over time can be expressed as a mapping12,
(F
t
0;F
t
1;M
t
0;M
t
1;u
t
old) = ￿(F
t￿1
0 ;F
t￿1
1 ;M
t￿1
0 ;M
t￿1
1 ;u
t￿1
old ) (P1)
where F t
i (Mt
j) denotes the number of females of age i (males of age j) in the
population in time t and ut
old (the ￿ old unions￿vector) denotes the vector of married
agents in the population at the beginning of period t.13
De￿nition 6. A stable population equilibrium in the above model is a vector
(b F0; b F1; c M0; c M1;b uold) and a scalar b r such that [(1+b r)b F0; (1+b r)b F1; (1+b r)c M0; (1+
b r)c M1; (1+b r)b uold] = ￿(b F0; b F1; c M0; c M1;b uold): In keeping with standard demographic
nomenclature, the population is ￿ stable￿since its age-sex structure is unchanging.
A stable population equilibrium is non-trivial when its size is not zero.
De￿nition 7. Eligible marriage market participants (ft
0;ft
1;mt
0;mt
1) are in a sta-
ble population equilibrium when in each period, this vector replicates itself upto
a constant factor.
I make the following assumptions to link Pollak￿ s BMMR model to the model
of marriage markets derived in the previous section. I assume that maximum total
fertilities of couples are exogenously given and that all children are born in the ￿rst
period of marriage of the couple. Pollak￿ s (1987) original model allows remarriage
￿I rede￿ne the mapping ￿ to incorporate the assumption of no remarriage made
in a previous section.
Note that the assumption of instant birth of o⁄spring has to be true for all
other than (0;0) matches since one or the other spouse dies at the end of the
￿rst period of marriage. Hence this assumption really applies to (0;0) couples
and states that they are impatient to conceive their children and partake of their
bene￿ts.
12See Appendix B.1 for a derivation of ￿ in the context of this model.
13Agents in the ￿ old unions￿vector are not in the pool of eligible marriage market participants
in period t. Matches that occur in period t enter the old unions vector in (t + 1).
14The analysis in this section assumes that birth rates and the sex ratio at birth
￿ are constant over time. These assumptions will be relaxed later.
The following proposition is then true14.
Proposition 3. : When the total population is in a stable population equilibrium
growing at the rate (1 + b r), the eligible population in the marriage market must
also be in a stable (population) equilibrium growing at the same rate.
Proposition 3 implies that in a stable ￿ total￿population equilibrium, the age-
sex composition of eligible marriage market participants is also ￿xed over time.
Hence agents￿expectations of future matching probabilities will be constant over
time too.
I now de￿ne a steady state equilibrium in the marriage market.
De￿nition 8. The marriage market is in a steady state equilibrium when agents￿
Nash equilibrium choices of decision variables (e.g. marriage payments) are con-
stant over time. When there are multiple possible equilibria in decision variables,
the marriage market is in a steady state equilibrium when the expected values of
the decision variables are constant over time.
Population dynamics and marriage market outcomes interact in the follow-
ing manner. In each period, old agents￿choice of marriage payments is deter-
mined by their marriage market returns in the current period. Young agents
determine their optimal marriage payments by looking at their current as well
as expected future returns from the marriage market. All decisions are informed
by a knowledge of the matching rule and expectations about the evolution of
the state variables (ft
0;ft
1;mt
0;mt
1) over time. The evolution of the state variables
(ft
0;ft
1;mt
0;mt
1) depends on the births in each period and the matching rule, which
determines which couples are matched and, hence, which birth rates govern the
evolution of the population (the rule also serves to remove eligible agents from
the pool of marriage market participants in the next period). This determines
the marriage market structure in each period and, through it, the marriage re-
turns and payments o⁄ered by potential bride and grooms. The complete set of
optimization problems and the evolution of the state variables are summarized in
Appendix C.
In a steady state equilibrium of the marriage market, the optimal marriage
payments and the age-sex structure of the population as determined by the above
14See proof in Appendix B.2
15procedure must be constant over time. Example 2 provides a numerical illustration
of such an equilibrium.
2.2.1. Example 2: Steady State Equilibrium
Assume that sex ratios and birth rates are exogenous and that the total fertility
of a couple depends only on the age of the woman in the couple. For concreteness,
suppose ￿ = 2; b0 = 1 and b1 = 0:67, where bi is the number of female children
born to mothers of age i and ￿ is the (male/female) sex ratio at birth. Also
suppose K = 2; s = 3 and ￿ = 0:5.
It is easy to show that ft
1 = 0 and ft
0 = 0:5mt
1 will de￿ne a stable population
equilibrium of marriage market participants, with a growth rate of (1 + b r) = 115.
In the equilibrium, older agents have a higher marital surplus and will be matched
￿rst16.
To see why ( ft
1 = 0; ft
0 = 0:5mt
1) is a stable population equilibrium, suppose
that in period T the demographic structure of the marriage market is as follows:
f
T
0 = x; f
T
1 = 0; m
T
0 = 2x; m
T
1 = 2x for some x > 0
Note that this structure is consistent with the claimed stable population equi-
librium structure (recall that mt
0 = ￿ft
0; by de￿nition). I will now argue, using the
mapping ￿, that this marriage market structure is replicated in period (T + 1).
Recall that, in equilibrium, the matching rule will pair older men ￿rst. Since
there are more older men than young women, all young women (x) ￿nd a match
and each produces 1 female birth (b0 = 1) and 2 male births (￿b0 = 2) in T. But
this means that in period (T +1) the number of young women is x and the number
of young men is 2x. Also, the number of older women in the market in (T + 1)
is 0 since all young women in time T ￿nd a partner. Since none of the young
men (2x) in period T ￿nd a partner, they comprise the cohort of older men in the
market in (T + 1). Notice that the marriage market demographics of period T is
replicated in period (T + 1). This satis￿es the de￿nition of a stable population
equilibrium with growth rate (1 + b r) = 1.
What do marriage payments look like in the steady state equilibrium? Since
the older men outnumber the women in each period, the former engage in within
group competition and bid their entire marriage surplus as bride price. Young
15Note that Ft
0 = ft
0; Mt
0 = mt
0; Ft
1 = f
t￿1
0 ; Mt
1 = m
t￿1
0 : Hence, the stable population
equilibrium structure of the total population is the same as that of marriage market participants.
16See Appendix D for proof.
16men are not able to compete with this payment since the bride price o⁄ered by
high-surplus older men exceeds the former￿ s lower marriage surplus (and hence,
the maximum bride price that young men are willing to pay). Hence, at the
equilibrium payments o⁄ered, young women strictly prefer older men to young
men. The matching rule, therefore, pairs young women with older men. All
the women ￿nd a partner whereas some older men and all young men remain
unmatched.
2.3. Choice of Sex Ratio
This section presents the model of sex-ratio choice. The sex ratio of o⁄spring cho-
sen by parents is informed by demographics and expectations of marriage market
returns, and feeds back into population dynamics via the BMMR Model described
in the previous section.
Here I make the following assumptions.
Parents are responsible for arranging their o⁄spring￿ s marriage. After mar-
riage, paired agents may choose the sex composition of o⁄spring based on their
total fertility level as well as the ￿ value￿they place on girls versus boys.
The maximum total fertility of a married couple is exogenous and depends
only on the age of the woman. Let ￿i be the maximum total fertility of a couple
with a woman of age i. Then ￿0 > ￿1, i.e. younger women are more fecund. Also,
as assumed before, couples have all their children in their ￿rst period of marriage.
The ￿ value￿of o⁄spring accrues to both parents, i.e. children are ￿ public goods￿
in the household. Rearing children is costless. The utility function of each married
agent is given by:
U
marr = c + Efbf + Embm ￿ (bf ￿ bm)
2 (F0:1)
where Eg is the expected marriage market surplus of an o⁄spring of gender g, bg
is the number of o⁄spring of gender g and c is consumption17.
Notice that there is a cost of choosing to skew the sex ratio of o⁄spring to
anything other than 118. This re￿ ects the cost of accessing technology such as
17Siow and Zhu (2002) use a quadratic cost of parental investment in o⁄spring￿ s health (which
a⁄ects their survival probabilities). The idea here is similar except that parents can directly and
instantaneously choose the sex ratio of o⁄spring at the time of childbirth, viz. in the period of
marriage.
18An alternative form of Umarr may be used: Umarr = c + Efbf + Embm ￿ 2(bf ￿ ￿f)2 ￿
2(bm ￿ ￿m)2 where ￿g represents the number of children of gender g that are born to a couple
17amniocentesis and sex-selective abortion or the psychological cost of infanticide
or neglect. Notice also that agents do not have an exogenous sex preference in
this model. The choice of sex ratio depends purely on the incentives generated in
the marriage market.
Finally, note that the assumption of arranged marriage separates marriage
decisions and sex ratio choice in every period, since these decisions are made by
di⁄erent sets of agents. Hence, c is not a decision variable for married agents but
is determined by the perishable wealth w and the terms of marriage formalized
by their parents19.
Ef and Em are determined by agents￿expectations of the relative numbers of
marriage market participants in the future, and the marriage payments that will
have to be paid at that time. In a steady state marriage market equilibrium, Ef
and Em will be the same over time ensuring that couple (c)-speci￿c birth rates bgc
(g = f;m) and sex ratios bmc
bfc are also constant over time.20
Formally, Eg (g = f;m) is de￿ned as follows:
Denote the total utility that a woman expects to receive over her lifetime by
e Ef:Then,
e Ef = p0[(w + K)(1 + ￿) ￿ ED
1
0] + (1 ￿ p0)p1[w + ￿fw + K ￿ 1 ￿ ED
1
1g
+f1 ￿ p0 ￿ (1 ￿ p0)p1g[w + ￿(w ￿ s)]
where pi is the probability that a woman of age i ￿nds a partner21.
If a woman cannot ￿nd a partner in her lifetime, she gets w+￿(w￿s): Hence
the total surplus that a daughter is expected to receive over her lifetime is
Ef = e Ef ￿[w+￿(w￿s)] = p0[K(1+￿)+￿s￿ED
1
0]+￿(1￿p0)p1[K+s￿1￿ED
1
1]
(F0:2)
￿ naturally￿(i.e. without intervention). Since ￿f = ￿m in the aggregate, using this form of Umarr
will not change the results of the paper.
19Think of o⁄spring as being the ￿ property￿of parents as long as they are single. Thus the
incomes w that children earn are also the property of parents as long as the former are unmarried.
When arranging a marriage, parents commit to transfer (or receive) a part of w (earned by the
children) as marriage payment on their behalf.
20Birth rates and sex ratios will depend on the total fertility of the couple. A steady state is
characterized by constancy of couple-speci￿c values of the same over time.
21Note that I do not break pi into the probabilities of matching with di⁄erent types in equi-
librium. This is not necessary since when agents are matched with more than one type in
equilibrium, they must be indi⁄erent between them (see Proposition 1). When matched with
only one type in equilibrium, e Eg must contain the probability of matching with this type and
the returns from this marriage.
18By a similar derivation,
Em = q0[(K ￿ 1)(1 + ￿) + ￿s + ED
0
0] + ￿(1 ￿ q0)q1[K + s + ED
1
0] (F0:3)
where qj is the probability that a man of age j ￿nds a partner.
Notice that optimization behavior of agents will ensure that Ef ￿ 0; Em ￿ 0:
The assumption that couples have all their children in their ￿rst period of
marriage reduces sex-ratio choice to a static problem. For a couple with a woman
of age i, the optimal sex-ratio is determined as follows:
Max
bf;bm
c + Efbf + Embm ￿ (bf ￿ bm)
2 (F1:1)
subject to the constraints,
bf + bm ￿ ￿i (F1:2)
bf ￿ 0
bm ￿ 0
Consider the following proposition22.
Proposition 4. In all non-trivial equilibria couples choose to have as many o⁄-
spring as their total fertility allows, ensuring that young mothers have more o⁄-
spring than old mothers. Maternal-age (i)-speci￿c sex ratios ￿i (male/female) of
o⁄spring are determined as follows:
when jEf ￿ Emj < 4￿1;
￿i =
4￿i ￿ (Ef ￿ Em)
4￿i + (Ef ￿ Em)
￿ (0;1) for i = 0;1 (F6)
when 4￿1 < jEf ￿ Emj < 4￿0;
￿0 =
4￿0 ￿ (Ef ￿ Em)
4￿0 + (Ef ￿ Em)
￿ (0;1) (F7:1)
￿1 = 0 if Em < Ef (F7:2)
￿1 = 1 if Em > Ef
Further, there is no non-trivial steady state equilibrium compatible with the
condition jEf ￿ Emj > 4￿0:
22See proof in Appendix E.
19Notice that at the interior solutions (F6) and (F7:1), ￿i increases (decreases)
with decline in total fertility ￿i if Ef ￿Em < 0 (Ef ￿Em > 0). In other words, a
reduction in fertility skews the sex ratio in favor of o⁄spring with higher expected
marriage market returns. This relationship between fertility and the sex ratio is
consistent with empirical observations from India (Das Gupta and Bhat (1997)).
I shall now de￿ne a steady state general equilibrium.
De￿nition 9. A steady state general equilibrium is obtained when the following
conditions are true:
i. the total population and the eligible marriage market population are in
stable population equilibrium, and
ii. the marriage market is in a steady state equilibrium, viz. marriage payments
and sex-ratios are unchanging over time.
A steady state general equilibrium is non-trivial when the size of the total
population is non-zero.
Example 3 demonstrates the existence of a steady state general equilibrium as
de￿ned above.
2.3.1. Example 3: Steady State General Equilibrium
Consider, for concreteness, the following parameter values: ’0 = 3; ’1 = 2; K =
0:2; s = 5; ￿ = 0:25
Then a non-trivial steady state general equilibrium exists and has the following
characteristics23:
1. Young men are not willing to marry at the o⁄ered marriage payments be-
cause K is too small (K < 1).
2. The equilibrium matching rule matches old men and old women ￿rst when
agents are indi⁄erent to the age of their spouse.
3. In the stable population equilibrium, q0 = 0; q1 = 1; p0 = 0:787; p1 = 1.
That is, in every period, young men refrain from marrying and old men
are matched with all old women and some young women. Also, the stable
population grows at the rate (1 + b r) = 1:237; so b r = 0:237: This is true at
the optimal birth rates and sex ratios derived in (5) below.
23See Appendix F for a detailed derivation.
204. The equilibrium marriage payments are D1
0 =
K+2￿
1￿￿ = 0:93; D1
1 =
K+1+￿
1￿￿ =
1:93: Hence the equilibrium payments are dowries.
5. The optimal maternal-age-speci￿c birth rates and sex ratios are: bf0 =
1:38; bm0 = 1:62; ￿0 = 1:17; bf1 = 0:88; bm1 = 1:12; ￿1 = 1:27
3. The Indian Scenario
Since high-surplus agents are matched ￿rst in equilibrium, the matching rule
associated with a steady state general equilibrium will be determined by the
pre-payments marriage surpluses of agents. These depend on model parameters
(K; s; ￿) and the age-sex composition of the marriage market in equilibrium.
What parameter values and matching rule are appropriate for the Indian case?
One way to determine the answer is by looking at data on marriage market indi-
cators in India and ascertaining the parameter values in the model that generate
predictions consistent with these.
One of these indicators is the universality of female marriage in India. Table 4,
from Goyal (1988) lists estimates of the percentage of single females in di⁄erent age
groups by birth cohort. The proportion of single females in the age-group 35-39 is
0.5% for cohorts 1931-36 to 1946-51. Since the Indian population started growing
from the 1930s these are the cohorts that would be the ￿rst to experience the
demographic squeeze. Yet we see that most women in these cohorts ￿nd partners
during their lifetime. This suggests, in my model, that the matching rule is such
that older women are matched ￿rst when men are indi⁄erent to the age of their
spouses. It is easy to see why ￿if young women exceed the number of men in the
marriage market (due to population growth), there will clearly be some women
who do not ￿nd a match when young.24 If in the next period young women again
exceed the number of men in the marriage market and are matched before old
women, then it must be the case that none of the old women in the market in this
period ￿nd a match in their lifetime. Since this has not been observed empirically,
it seems reasonable to assume that parameter values are such that the matching
rule matches old women before young women.
24Since the overall sex ratio in India has been masculine throughout the last century, these
young women would have all found a match if young men were willing to marry them. But
then, the age at which men marry should have declined over time. This has not been observed
in India. The ages at marriage of both men and women have been rising with a narrowing of
the age gap at marriage (Mensch et al (2005), Bhat and Halli (1999)).
21Another useful set of indicators are overall and juvenile sex ratios and their
behavior over time. Figure 3, from Mayer (1999) and Hutter et al (1996) shows
that the sex ratio (female/male) in India has been steadily falling throughout the
twentieth century. Bhat and Halli (1999) estimate juvenile sex ratios in 1911 and
1981 and ￿nd that these have become more ￿ masculine￿over the period too. Sudha
and Rajan (1999) also ￿nd sex ratios at birth to have become more masculine in
the period 1981-91 and report a worsening female mortality disadvantage during
this time. In the context of my model, women would not be in surplus in the
marriage market if the juvenile sex ratio (male/female) were greater than one
and men were willing to marry young. The latter phenomenon could generate a
demographic marriage squeeze against men and result in bride price instead of
dowry, violating the evidence on rising dowries in India in the latter half of the
twentieth century. Further, the minimum age of ￿rst marriage for men in India
has been persistently higher than that of women despite an increasing trend of
delayed marriage for both sexes over the last century (Mensch et al (2005)). These
indicators suggest that parameter values may be such that young men in India
choose to postpone marriage at the o⁄ered marriage payments. In the analysis
that follows, I assume this to be the case.
Despite the inherent di¢ culties of analytically deriving the properties of popu-
lation equilibria in Pollak￿ s (1987) model, it is possible to characterize steady state
equilibria in the general equilibrium model presented here, under the parametric
restrictions imposed by the above.
There are ￿ve possible demographic con￿gurations that may be obtained in a
non-trivial steady state general equilibrium. These are:
(a) f
t
1 > m
t
1 > 0 (I1)
(b) f
t
1 = m
t
1 < f
t
1 + f
t
0
(c) f
t
1 < f
t
1 + f
t
0 = m
t
1
(d) f
t
1 < f
t
1 + f
t
0 < m
t
1
(e) f
t
1 < m
t
1 < f
t
1 + f
t
0
Proposition 5 states the properties of steady state general equilibria when the
sex ratio is exogenous25.
Proposition 5. Suppose parameter values are such that young men postpone
marriage at the o⁄ered payments, and old women are matched before young
25See proof in Appendix G.
22women. Assume that the sex ratio is exogenously given. Then there is
dowry in steady state equilibrium when ￿ < (1 + b r) + (1 ￿ p0) and bride price
when ￿ ￿ (1 + b r) + (1 ￿ p0), where ￿ denotes the aggregate (exogenous) male-
to-female sex ratio, (1+b r) denotes the equilibrium growth rate of the population
and p0 denotes the proportion of young women who ￿nd a partner in every period
in the steady state equilibrium.
The intuition of Proposition 5 follows from the law of supply and demand. It
states that there is dowry in the steady state equilibrium when there is an excess
supply of women and bride price when there is an excess supply of men. The
male-to-female sex ratio, ￿; governs the number of men in the marriage market,
all of whom must belong to the older cohort since young men postpone marriage.
But the women in the market can belong to both younger and older cohorts. The
growth rate (1 + b r) governs the young cohort whereas (1 ￿ p0) ￿the proportion
of young women who fail to ￿nd a partner when young ￿governs the size of the
older cohort of unmarried women. Therefore, when ￿ < (1 + b r) + (1 ￿ p0), there
is an excess supply of women and hence dowry payments in steady state, whereas
the reverse inequality is associated with bride price26.
The result of Proposition 5 reinstates the intuition of the marriage squeeze hy-
pothesis in the long run. When the population growth rate is high relative to the
(male-to-female) sex ratio, dowry payments are observed whereas a relatively low
population growth rate is associated with bride price. Example 2 demonstrates
the existence of a steady state equilibrium with bride price. However, Proposition
5 (and Example 2) assumes that the sex ratio is exogenous, and hence incorporates
only a one-way link from population dynamics to the marriage market. Proposi-
tion 6 incorporates the e⁄ect of the two-way link between population dynamics
and marriage market outcomes by allowing endogenous sex ratios27.
Proposition 6. Suppose parameter values are such that young men postpone
marriage at the o⁄ered payments, and old women are matched before young
women. Assume that parents choose the sex ratio of o⁄spring as in (F1).
Then,
26A subsequent discussion (see the discussion of Proposition 6) will demonstrate that when
￿ = (1 + b r) + (1 ￿ p0), there will be multiple equilibria in marriage payments. In this case ￿
case (c) ￿individual payments may be dowry or bride price but under the assumptions made,
the expected payment will be a bride price.
27See Appendix H for proof of Proposition 6.
231. the only demographic con￿guration that is consistent with a non-trivial
steady state general equilibrium is (e) (see (I1)) and the equilibrium mar-
riage payment is a dowry. The aggregate male-to-female sex ratio at birth
(￿) in this equilibrium is greater than 1.
2. at the non-trivial steady state general equilibrium,
￿ < (1 + b r) + (1 ￿ p0)
where ￿ denotes the equilibrium aggregate male-to-female sex ratio, (1+ b r)
denotes the equilibrium growth rate of the population and p0 denotes the
proportion of young women who ￿nd a partner in every period in the steady
state equilibrium.
Point (2) in Proposition 6 highlights the di⁄erence in the characteristics of
long-run equilibrium for endogenous versus exogenously given sex ratios. Recall,
from Proposition 5, that when ￿ is exogenous there could be dowry or bride price
in long-run equilibrium depending on whether ￿ 7 (1+b r)+(1￿p0). Point (2) in
Proposition 6 states, that when ￿ is endogenous, it will be less than (1+b r)+(1￿p0)
in equilibrium, whatever be the level of fertility. Hence any long-run equilibrium
must have dowry payments.
To see the intuition of point (1) in Proposition 6, consider, individually, each
of the cases (a) ￿ (d) in (I1).
Suppose (a) is true in a steady state general equilibrium. This is possible
only if the overall sex ratio ￿ is less than 1, viz. more women than men in any
generation. This is because, if old women are paired ￿rst by the matchmaker,
then ft
1 > mt
1 implies ft
1 = F
t￿1
0 (since none of the young women can ￿nd a match
in any period). Also, if young men postpone marriage, then mt
1 = M
t￿1
0 . Hence,
(a) implies ￿t￿1 =
Mt￿1
0
Ft￿1
0
=
mt
1
ft
1 < 1 and since ￿t￿1 = ￿t = ￿ in a steady state
equilibrium, (a) can be sustained only when the equilibrium sex ratio ￿ < 1:
Now consider the marriage payments consistent with an equilibrium of the
form (a). Within-group competition among old (high-surplus) females would lead
to the payment of a dowry that is equal to the latter￿ s entire surplus from marriage.
At these high payments and the expected probabilities of matching consistent with
(a), the expected returns from marriage are higher for men (Em > Ef); so it is
not worthwhile for parents to have more daughters than sons. Hence, a ￿ greater
than 1 is generated in all non-trivial equilibria, demonstrating that (a) cannot be
sustained in a steady state equilibrium.
24By an argument similar to the one presented above, (b) would be true in a
steady state equilibrium only if ￿ = 1. However, when the demographic structure
is of the form (b), there are multiple equilibria in marriage payments since the
high-surplus agents (old men and old women) are equal in number, implying that
neither group has a credible threat point in marriage market bargaining. The
lower limit of payments, D1
1, is the dowry that makes old men indi⁄erent to the
age of their spouse (recall that there are young women in the marriage market
also) and the upper limit is the payment that reduces the surplus of old women
to zero. I assume that in such circumstances, the matchmaker draws the actual
payments associated with each match from a uniform distribution over the feasible
range. The average payment, ED1
0; is then a dowry. At this payment, however,
sons have a higher expected return from the marriage market, so parents prefer
to have more sons than daughters and ￿ > 1. This shows that (b) cannot be
sustained in a steady state equilibrium either.
If (c) were true in a steady state equilibrium, the resulting marriage market
demographics would be ft
1 = 0 (because all women are matched when young) and
ft
0 + ft
1 = ft
0 = mt
1. Such a demographic structure may be replicated in every
period, only if the equilibrium growth rate of the population, (1 + b r); is exactly
equal to the sex ratio, ￿:28 Note also that since women must bear children in the
￿rst period of marriage and since there are no old women among eligible marriage
market participants, the equilibrium growth rate of the population must be equal
to the number of girls born to young women. These observations imply that
￿ =
bm0
bf0 = (1 + b r) = bf0 which further implies b2
f0 = bm0:
I show in Appendix H that at the expected marriage payments implied by
(c), (b2
f0 = bm0) cannot be satis￿ed for a set of parameters in the relevant range,
viz. K > 0; s > 0; ￿ ￿ (0;1) and that satisfy the matching rule. The intuition
of this result is as follows. If (c) is true in equilibrium, there will be multiple
equilibria in marriage payments since the number of potential brides and grooms
are exactly equal. The upper limit of payments, D1
0; is a dowry equal to young
women￿ s pre-payments marital surplus and the lower limit is the bride price equal
to old men￿ s pre-payments surplus. If old agents are the high-surplus agents who
28To see why, suppose that the population is growing in equilibrium so that (1+b r) > 1. This
will lead to more younger women in the population than older men, if ￿ ￿ 1. The numbers of
old men and young women will be equal in each period if and only if there are more men born
in each period than women (￿ > 1) and by the exact magnitude of population growth. Hence
(1 + b r) = ￿.
25are matched ￿rst, then it must be the case that the (absolute value of the) lower
limit exceeds the upper limit. This yields an average payment of bride price.29
Also, for older agents to be the high-surplus agents ￿ has to be su¢ ciently low
or else the surpluses of young agents driven by their two-period marital returns
would be higher. Since men get married only in the last period of their life ￿
with returns discounted by a low ￿ ￿and expect to pay a bride price at that
stage, it is not worthwhile for parents to have as many sons per daughter as
ensures ￿ = (1 + b r):Therefore, the marriage market outcomes corresponding to
(c) indicate a lower ￿ than that required to sustain (c) in a steady state general
equilibrium.
Suppose (d) were true in steady state equilibrium. This implies ft
1 = 0 (because
all women are matched when young) and ft
0 +ft
1 = ft
0 < mt
1. Such a demographic
structure may be replicated in every period only if the equilibrium growth rate of
the population, (1+b r); is less than the sex ratio, ￿. Since ￿ has to be su¢ ciently
large to sustain an equilibrium like (d) there must be an upper limit on (Ef ￿Em)
in equilibrium, because ￿ varies inversely with it (see Proposition 4, (F6); (F7:1)).
It may be shown, however, that at the equilibrium marriage payments implied by
(d), (Ef ￿Em) will be higher than this upper limit and ￿ will be lower than that
which can sustain an equilibrium like (d). This is true because at an equilibrium
of the form (d), old men will pay their entire pre-payments marital surplus as
bride price to young women. If old men and old women are the high surplus
agents, then this bride price will be too large for parents to want as many sons
per daughter as is required to sustain (d).
Hence (e) is the only demographic con￿guration possible in equilibrium. Ex-
ample 3 demonstrates numerically that a steady state equilibrium of the form
(e) exists. I show in Appendix H that in an equilibrium of the form (e); ￿ is
greater than 1 and the equilibrium marriage payment is a dowry. This is due to
the following reasons.
First, there are more eligible women than men in the marriage market since
young men postpone marriage. Second, young women stand to gain a positive
surplus from marriage. This is because they value marriage su¢ ciently to want
to marry young and reap this value over two periods. In equilibrium, there are
enough men for all the old women (who are matched ￿rst), but not for all the
young women. Thus within-group competition makes young women bid away their
entire surplus which, being positive, is a dowry. Old women engage in between-
29Once again assuming that the matchmaker draws the actual payments from a uniform
distribution over the feasible range.
26group competition and match this o⁄er to make men indi⁄erent to the age of their
spouse. Hence, they pay dowry too. This structure of payments and matching
probabilities ensure that the marriage market returns of men exceed that of women
(Em > Ef), so parents choose more sons than daughters in equilibrium (￿ > 1):
However, recall that the marriage market returns of men are single-period
returns that are discounted by ￿ because they occur late. Also, if old agents are
the high-surplus agents, then ￿ must be su¢ ciently small or else the two-period
gains of young agents would exceed that of their older counterparts (see proof
in Appendix H). Moreover, since the high-surplus older women do not engage
in within-group competition for a spouse, the dowry paid in equilibrium is less
than the total surplus of old women. Since the entire surplus of old women is
not extracted the equilibrium dowry is relatively small. All these factors impose
an upper limit of the excess marriage market returns of men, ensuring that the
equilibrium ￿ is not skewed (high) enough to reverse the marriage squeeze against
women.
The discussion above demonstrates that while a bride price equilibrium cannot
be sustained in the long-run, there exists a dowry equilibrium that can. The
former is true because parents overproduce girls whenever they are expected to
earn bride price in future. However, the dowry equilibrium in (e) can be sustained
because the upper limit imposed on men￿ s marriage market returns ensures that
boys are not overproduced despite the sex ratio being skewed in favor of males.
The prediction is noteworthy for its remarkable accuracy in describing current
conditions in the Indian marriage market, as outlined in the following table.30 It
also provides an explanation for why dowries can persist over time even in the
face of long-practised female infanticide and foeticide.
Variable Model Evidence
Marriage Payments Dowry Dowry
Sex Ratio Masculine Masculine
% Men Married by Age 45-49 100 97.6
4. Extension: Introducing a Cost Parameter in Sex Ratio
Choice
With the widespread availability of sex-selective abortion techniques since the
1980s, the cost of biasing the sex ratio is expected to have fallen. Will this be
30The datum on percentage of men married by age 45-49 is from Tertilt (2004).
27instrumental in skewing the sex ratio su¢ ciently in favor of men to reverse the
marriage squeeze against women (and the result of Proposition 6)? This section
introduces a cost parameter in sex ratio choice. I show that a low cost of skewing
the sex ratio is a su¢ cient condition for the main result of this paper to hold.
Let ￿ be a cost parameter in the post-marriage utility function,
U
marr = c + Efbf + Embm ￿ ￿(bf ￿ bm)
2; ￿ > 0 (F0:1a)
Note that in the model presented in the previous sections, ￿ = 1.
Proposition 7 outlines the optimal sex-ratio choice of agents when the post-
marriage utility function is of the form (F0:1a). It reinstates the results of Propo-
sition 4 (where ￿ = 1)31.
Proposition 7. Suppose that the post-marriage utility function of agents is given
by (F0:1a). In all non-trivial equilibria, couples choose to have as many o⁄spring
as their total fertility allows, ensuring that young mothers have more o⁄spring
than old mothers. Maternal-age (i)-speci￿c sex ratios ￿i (male/female) of o⁄spring
are determined as follows:
when jEf ￿ Emj < 4￿￿1;
￿i =
4￿￿i ￿ (Ef ￿ Em)
4￿￿i + (Ef ￿ Em)
￿ (0;1) for i = 0;1 (F6a)
when 4￿￿1 < jEf ￿ Emj < 4￿￿0;
￿0 =
4￿￿0 ￿ (Ef ￿ Em)
4￿￿0 + (Ef ￿ Em)
￿ (0;1) (F7:1a)
￿1 = 0 if Em < Ef (F7:2a)
￿1 = 1 if Em > Ef
Further, there is no non-trivial steady state equilibrium compatible with
the condition jEf ￿ Emj > 4￿￿0:
The results in Proposition 7 are used to derive Proposition 8, which summarizes
the characteristics of a steady state general equilibrium when the post-marriage
utility function is of the form (F0:1a)32.
31See Appendix I.1 for proof of Proposition 7.
32See Appendix I.2 for proof of Proposition 8.
28Proposition 8. Suppose parameter values are such that young men postpone
marriage at the o⁄ered payments, and old women are matched before young
women. Suppose that the post marriage utility function is given by (F0:1a) where
￿ (> 0) represents the cost to parents of choosing to skew the sex ratio of o⁄spring.
If ￿ < (1 + ￿), then the only demographic con￿guration that is consistent with
a steady state general equilibrium is (e) (see (I1)) and the equilibrium marriage
payment is a dowry. The aggregate male-to-female sex ratio at birth (￿) in this
equilibrium is greater than 1.
The intuition of Proposition 8 is as follows. Notice in (F6a) and (F7:1a) that
￿ has the same e⁄ect on sex ratios as fertility ￿i. In other words, a decline in ￿
skews the sex ratio in favor of the o⁄spring with the higher expected surplus in
the marriage market. This suggests that a low value of ￿ may lead to an over-
production of boys when dowry is expected, thereby invalidating the result of
Proposition 6. This is not true, however, because a low cost of sex ratio choice
does not alter the fact that men marry late and receive a single-period discounted
return from marriage whereas women expect to receive two periods of marital
gains. Thus the upper limits on (Em ￿ Ef) and ￿ continue to hold and parents
do not over-produce boys in the equilibrium (e), allowing dowry to be sustained
in the long run. However, low ￿ makes a bride price equilibrium even less likely
because it makes parents more inclined to over-produce girls when bride price is
expected. A high ￿ is, therefore, a necessary condition for a bride price to be
sustained in equilibrium because this precludes agents from ￿ over-responding￿to
the associated high excess returns of girls (Ef ￿ Em > 0).
Propositions 6 and 8 demonstrate that at the given parameters and preference
structure Ef is more ￿ sensitive￿to marriage market conditions than Em. This is
because women are willing to marry young and when they do so, reap the (high)
bene￿ts of marriage in both periods of life. Men, on the other hand, marry only
when old whereupon their returns are discounted by ￿ (which has to be low to
justify the matching rule). Further, the di⁄erent ages at marriage for men and
women imply that a dollar of dowry is valued less in the calculation of Em ￿
because it is received late and is discounted ￿than a dollar of bride price in the
calculation of Ef. The resulting ￿ excess￿sensitivity of Ef ensures that a female
advantage in the marriage market cannot be sustained in the long run because
girls are overproduced whenever bride price is expected. The limited sensitivity
of Em, however, guarantees that there exists an equilibrium, viz. (e), where the
chosen ￿ is low enough to sustain the male advantage in the marriage market.
295. Summary and Conclusion
The dowry in￿ ation that has been observed in India since the 1950s has been
attributed to a marriage squeeze against women caused by population growth. In
this paper, I ask if declining fertility levels and widespread sex-selective abortion
against women will lead to a reversal of the squeeze and a regime of bride price
in the long run.
I show, using an overlapping-generations dynamic general equilibrium frame-
work, that at parameter values consistent with marriage market indicators in India
the only possible steady state equilibria are characterized by dowry payments, a
marriage squeeze against women and a masculine sex ratio. I show, moreover,
that this result is true at low costs of skewing the sex ratio, which with the advent
of sex-selective abortion techniques in India, is suspected to be the case.
The above result stems from an analysis that focuses purely on the incentives
of the marriage market. It provides valuable insights on the interplay between
marriage decisions and population dynamics and makes a contribution to the
literature in an area that has not been traversed before. In particular, it generates
a prediction that explains why women may have to pay for a groom even in the
face of long-practised female infanticide and feticide.
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34Table 1: Population (millions) and Population Growth of India, 1891-1991
Year Population
Absolute 
Growth
Decadal 
Growth
Average Annual Exponential 
Growth Rate
(millions) (millions) (%) (%)
1891 235.9
1901 238.4 2.5 1.1 0.11
1911 252.1 13.7 5.7 0.56
1921 251.3 -0.8 -0.3 -0.03
1931 279.0 27.7 11.0 1.04
1941 318.7 39.7 14.2 1.33
1951 361.1 42.4 13.3 1.25
1961 439.2 78.1 21.5 1.96
1971 548.2 109.0 24.8 2.20
1981* 683.3 135.1 24.7 2.20
1991** 846.3 163.0 23.6 2.14
Source: Registrar General of India, Census
*Including Assam: population estimated to be 18.04 million
**Including Jammu and Kashmir: population estimated to be 7.72 million
Reproduced from Hutter et al (1996), pp.9
35Table 2: Crude Birth Rate 
(CBR) and Crude Death Rate 
(CDR) in India, 1891-1981
Table 2
 (contd.): Crude Birth Rate (CBR) and Crude Death Rate (CDR) in 
India, 1980-1992
Year CBR* CDR** Year
CBR*  CDR** 
Rural Urban Combined Rural Urban Combined
1891-1901 48 48 1980-82 35.4 27.6 33.8 13.6 7.7 12.3
1901-11 49 43 1981-83 35.4 27.8 33.8 13.3 7.7 12.1
1911-21 49 49 1982-84 35.3 28.6 33.8 13.3 8.0 12.1
1921-31 47 37 1983-85 35.0 28.6 33.6 13.3 8.1 12.1
1931-41 45 33 1984-86 34.6 28.2 33.2 13.0 8.0 11.8
1941-51 43 31 1985-87 34.1 27.5 32.6 12.4 7.6 11.3
1951-61 44 26 1986-88 33.6 26.9 32.1 12.0 7.6 11.0
1961-71 42 20 1987-89 33.0 26.3 31.5 11.7 7.4 10.7
1971-81 37 15 1988-90 32.3 25.4 30.8 11.2 7.2 10.3
1989-91 31.6 24.7 30.1 10.7 7.1 9.9
1992 30.7 23.1 29.0 10.8 7.0 10.0
Source: Registrar General of India, 
Census Source: Registrar General of India, Sample Registration System (SRS)
*CBR: Births per 1000 population
**CDR: Deaths per 1000 population
Reproduced from Hutter et al (1996), pp. 11
36Fig 2: Demographic Transition in India, 1891-1991
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
Year
B
i
r
t
h
s
/
 
D
e
a
t
h
s
 
p
e
r
 
1
0
0
0
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
CBR
CDR
Fig 1: Population of India (millions), 1891-1991
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981* 1991**
Year
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
)
37Table 3: Sex Ratio in 
India, 1901-1991
Year Sex Ratio*
1901 972
1911 964
1921 955
1931 950
1941 945
1951 946
1961 941
1971 930
1981 934
1991 927
Source: Registrar General 
of India, Census
*Females per 1000 males
Reproduced from Hutter 
et al (1996), pp. 14
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38Table 4: Percentage of Single Females in Different Age Groups, and Mean and Median Ages at 
Marriage by Birth Cohorts: India, 1886-91 to 1946-51
Birth Percentage of Single in Age Group Age at Marriage
Cohorts 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 Mean Median
1886-91 98.6 88.1 54.3 15.9 4.4 2.4 1.9 1.3 13.05 13.05
1891-96 98.6 88.9 54.9 16.3 4.8 2.5 1.6 1.1 13.17 13.13
1896-01 98.5 88.9 55.5 17.6 5.2 2.1 1.3 1.0 13.25 13.22
1901-06 98.5 89.0 57.8 18.8 4.7 1.8 1.1 0.9 13.36 13.49
1906-11 98.5 89.9 60.1 17.7 4.2 1.6 1.2 0.9 13.38 13.69
1911-16 98.7 90.7 54.7 16.6 4.2 1.4 1.3 1.2 13.12 13.11
1916-21 98.8 88.3 49.3 20.9 4.1 2.5 2.1 1.1 13.13 12.37
1921-26 98.2 85.8 62.4 25.2 4.6 3.6 1.5 0.7 13.93 14.16
1926-31 97.6 88.8 75.5 26.7 5.2 2.8 1.0 0.6 14.75 15.11
1931-36 98.1 91.9 75.6 28.1 5.6 1.9 0.9 0.5 15.00 15.19
1936-41 98.6 92.5 75.8 28.6 6.0 1.9 0.8 0.5 15.11 15.23
1941-46 98.6 93.2 78.2 29.2 7.5 2.0 0.8 0.5 15.38 15.38
1946-51 98.6 96.6 80.5 36.1 9.1 2.1 0.8 0.5 16.12 15.93
Source: C.R. Malaker, Study of Indian Nuptiality, Ph.D dissertation, 1978. Indian Statistical Institute, pp. 85-86
Reproduced from Goyal (1988), pp. 17
39